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3. Defending Judicial Independence while Denying
Reality to Save Mutual Trust: The Court of Justice’s
Mixed Contribution
Following its seminal 2018 ruling in the Portuguese judges case, the Court’s
infringement judgments and orders have helped limiting the amount of irreparable
damage done to judicial independence. The same cannot be said of the Court’s
judgments in preliminary ruling cases as the Court, in this context, appears reluctant
to take full account of the structural reality its own infringement judgments and orders
have accurately depicted. One cannot however save mutual trust when judicial
independence is systemically gone, which is what the Court is seemingly seeking to
achieve. This approach may also seem unwise as it seriously increases the risk of
inciting bottom-up resistance from national courts keen to prevent the authoritarian
gangrene from spreading to their systems.
Joined Cases C-558/18 and C-563/18, Miasto #owicz and Prokurator Generalny
This judgment originates from two requests for a preliminary ruling submitted by
two Polish judges. Possibly for the first time ever, these two requests were, in
part, motivated by the referring judges’ “fear of retribution if they do not adjudicate
in favour of the State.” And indeed, in yet another unprecedented and sinister
development, the two judges “were called to account for their decisions to submit
the present requests for a preliminary ruling by way of investigation procedures.”
And last November, Judge Tuleya, one of the two referring judges, was unlawfully
suspended and his judicial immunity unlawfully waived by a panel of the “Disciplinary
Chamber” (DC) which included a presumed member of the Ministry of Justice’s “troll
farm” denounced by PACE in January 2020. In one last brave move before he was
denied access to the courtroom and his case files, Judge Tuleya was able to submit
a preliminary request to the ECJ.
While the ECJ ultimately found both requests inadmissible, the Court’s reasoning
is particularly instructive, with the ruling itself containing the strongest warning to
date that Polish authorities must cease to threaten or expose national judges to
disciplinary proceedings for submitting references for a preliminary ruling. Indeed,
“the mere prospect … of being the subject of disciplinary proceedings as a result of
making such a reference or deciding to maintain that reference” violates EU law.
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As noted in Part I of this post, this warning has remained unheeded. Furthermore,
notwithstanding the welcome warning regarding the chilling effect of disciplinary
proceedings, the Court’s ruling in #owicz suffers from three main shortcomings:
1. It may be understood as abandoning national referring judges to their fates by
deciding that “not everyjudge in every procedure is in the position to remedy
potential violations of judicial independence with a reference to Luxembourg”;
2. It fails to adequately make clear that disciplinary investigations also violate EU
law when they aim to dissuade judges from applying EU law, which has led
authoritarian-minded authorities to deliberately leave targeted judges in limbo by
delaying the formal initiation of disciplinary proceedings;
3. It fails to draw the logical conclusion from the Court’s own observation,
to support its finding of inadmissibility, that the investigation proceedings
concerning the referring judges have since been closed. But “in taking note of
this, the Court contradicts its own insistence on the fact that the mere prospect
of being disciplined is enough to deter judges from discharging their judicial duty
in a truly independent manner”.
Case C-791/19 R, Commission v. Poland
On 8 April 2020, the Court’s Grand Chamber granted the Commission’s request
to order the suspension of the application of the national provisions relating to the
powers of Poland’s “Star Chamber” with regard to disciplinary cases concerning
judges. As noted by one of the present authors, this order is both significant and
unprecedented: “It is significant, because it makes clear that EU law prohibits
Member States from setting up national disciplinary bodies which, themselves, fail
to satisfy the guarantees inherent in effective judicial protection. It is unprecedented,
to the extent that the ECJ has demanded the immediate suspension […] of the
processing of all disciplinary cases regarding judges pending before a body which
views itself as a court notwithstanding multiple judgments to the contrary by three
chambers of Poland’s Supreme Court.”
It is also worth stressing that the ECJ ordered that Polish authorities refrain from
referring any disciplinary cases pending before the DC before a panel whose
composition does not meet the requirements of independence as defined by the
Court, in particular, in its AK judgment. This AK judgment, however, has since been
formally voided by the DC without, as noted in Part I, any reaction from the European
Commission whatsoever.
As regards the Court’s order of 8 April 2020, it suffers from one key weakness which
derives from the Commission’s failure to take into account the obvious potential
for a bad faith and arbitrary use of the procedure to waive judicial immunity under
the auspices of the DC acting hand in hand with Poland’s National Prosecution
Office. In this respect, one may helpfully recall that in 2016 the office of Public
Prosecutor General was merged with that of the Minister of Justice on the basis of
a law described by the Venice Commission as “unacceptable in a State governed
by the rule of law”. The ECJ could have prevented this entirely predictable abusive
lifting of judicial immunity by tighter language regarding how the notion of disciplinary
proceeding must be understood; by better emphasising that measures which may
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lead to “any dismissal of those who have the task of adjudicating” form part of the
disciplinary regime; and holding that the processing of all cases pending before the
DC must be suspended as it appears, prima facie, to be a body not established by
law.
That said, it has always been ludicrous to pretend that the waiving of judicial
immunity by the DC does not amount to a violation of the ECJ order as this would
allegedly amount to a procedure of a criminal nature. Suffice it to point out in this
respect that the DC has continued to impose disciplinary sanctions when lifting the
judicial immunity of judges who happened – pure coincidence no doubt – to be the
most vocal defenders of judicial independence. It was good but still exasperating
to see the Commission waking up about six months too late when it finally issued
an additional letter of formal notice making clear that Poland is violating EU law
by allowing the DC to decide matters such as cases for the lifting of immunity.
Meanwhile, the number of victims of Poland’s rule of law breakdown continues to
increase.
Joined Cases C#354/20 PPU and C#412/20 PPU Openbaar Ministerie
On 17 December 2020, the Court’s Grand Chamber held that the existence of
evidence of systemic or generalised deficiencies concerning judicial independence
in Poland (or indeed, even evidence of an increase in those deficiencies) cannot
in itself suffice to justify a refusal to execute European arrest warrants (EAWs)
issued by Polish courts. Instead, each national court (when acting as an executing
judicial authority) must continue to assess in each case whether there is a specific
risk of a breach of the right to a fair trial of the person concerned should he/she be
surrendered.
Notwithstanding some minor improvements such as the new emphasis on the need
to “exercise vigilance” in a situation where rule of law deficiencies have increased,
this ruling mostly reiterates the flawed logic of the Celmer ruling. What’s more, to
save mutual trust, the ECJ omitted from its reasoning inconvenient facts such as
the legalisation of the systemic violation of EU judicial independence requirements
organised by the muzzle law, and the DC’s decision of 23 September 2020 which
formally voided its own ruling in AK.
As we wrote in January 2019, by requiring national courts to implement a two-
pronged case-by-case assessment before refusing any surrender, the ECJ refused
to accept that “in a situation of systemic attacks targeting the whole judicial system,
there is, by definition, already a “real risk” of a breach of the fundamental rights to an
independent tribunal and to a fair trial in every single case.”
We must maintain our position. As the Irish Supreme Court diplomatically put it in a
2019 judgment, one may question whether “there is then room or need for further
inquiry” once systemic deficiencies have been found. Indeed, the Court’s reasoning
means that even if Poland were to become a formal dictatorship and no unanimous
agreement was found to sanction Poland under Article 7(2) and (3) TEU, national
courts from other EU countries would still need to assess each EAW on a case-by-
case basis. EU primary law does not warrant this (misguided) interpretation. Holding
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that the EU law “requirement that courts be independent precludes the possibility
that they may be subject to a hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other
body” is of no help when Polish courts are already subject to systemic interferences
from the executive. The compliance of the Celmer two-step test with Article 6(1)
ECHR requirements may also be questioned due inter alia to the disproportionate
and unworkable burden it imposes on those subjects to EAWs.
The right to a fair trial can be said to be systematically violated following the adoption
of the muzzle law in a situation where furthermore the ECJ order of 8 April 2020 is
openly violated and the ECJ judgment of 19 November 2019 formally nullified. At the
very least, the burden of proof should be on the Polish judicial issuing authority. The
pragmatic concern of ensuring the proper working of the judicial cooperation system
embodied by the preliminary mechanism cannot justify disregarding the structural
violation of the principle of judicial independence, which the ECJ itself described as
essential to guarantee the effective judicial protection of individual’s rights under EU
law. The ECJ ought instead to establish a rebuttable presumption that Polish courts
are no longer independent. This would acknowledge reality without cutting off access
to the ECJ and violating Article 6(1) ECH requirements.
One may further consider that Polish courts can no longer be considered “judicial
authorities” notwithstanding the continuing bravery of so many individual judges. We
cannot however leave the right to a fair trial at the mercy of individual judges’ bravery
in a situation where each Polish judge may be subject to arbitrary disciplinary
sanctions for applying EU judicial independence requirements or refusing to obey
ministerial instructions which compel them not to directly answer Celmer-related
questions. In practice, the intention of these instructions is to prohibit Polish judges
from directly emailing their EU counterparts and force them to correspond via the
government. One may also mention additional instructions issued in 2020 (made
public by Rule of Law in Poland on 11 January 2021) which require presidents of
common courts to report to the Ministry of Justice any application of the ECJ AK
judgment and connected rulings issued by Poland’s Supreme Court. The underlying
aim of this reporting system is obvious: to facilitate the initiation of disciplinary
investigations should an ordinary court judge dare assessing the independence of
the “judges” appointed on the back of Poland’s so-called reforms from the standpoint
of EU law and/or ECHR law. Justice cannot be done in such a situation regardless of
whether the executive directly or does not directly interfere in a specific case.
4. The end of the road and the purge ahead
As observed by Adam Bodnar and Pawe# Filipek, EU institutions, including the ECJ,
must always bear in mind that time is absolutely of the essence when it comes to
preserving judicial independence in a situation where compliance with EU legal
requirements relating to judicial independence has been made a disciplinary tort!
Beyond all else, a widespread judicial purge has already been announced by
Poland’s de facto leader last month and preliminary steps have also been taken to
organise non-compliance with the recent seminal judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights in the case of Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland.
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Enough report. Enough dialogue. The time to decisively act was yesterday but it is
never too late to do the right thing and implacably enforce the rule of law.
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